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Poverty, Educational Achievement, and the Role of the Courts
Michael A. Rebell
Teachers College, Columbia University

The large and growing proportion of U.S. students who come from poverty backgrounds explains
this country’s relatively low performance on international achievement tests. These students
need a broad range of comprehensive educational services if they are to have a meaningful
opportunity to succeed in school. These opportunities include not only adequate resources for
basic K–12 educational services but also parent engagement, health and other services, and
additional early education, after-school, and summer programs. In most states, the schools
attended by students with the greatest needs tend to receive the fewest resources because of the
inequitable systems most states use for financing public education.
The United States’ critical educational goals cannot be met unless the courts undertake a
more active, sustained role in establishing a constitutional right to comprehensive educational
opportunity and in pressing states to provide the schools sufficient resources to provide all
students meaningful educational opportunities. The courts can effectively undertake this role, in
a manner that is consistent with constitutional separation of powers requirements, by focusing
on the comparative institutional strengths of each of the three branches of government.
______________________________________________________________________________

The large and growing proportion of U.S. students who come from poverty backgrounds is a
major explanation for this country’s relatively low performance on international achievement
tests.1 The United States has a larger percentage of students from poverty backgrounds than
virtually every other advanced European, Asian, or North American country.2 The fact that so
many U.S. students enter school with the large range of disadvantages that stem from poverty
also explains the failure of most U.S. schools to even come close to reaching the proficiency
targets established a dozen years ago by the federal No Child Left Behind Act. 3 This substandard
educational performance threatens this country’s ability to compete in the global economy, as
well as the continued viability of our democratic political system.
The impact of poverty on children’s learning is profound and multidimensional. Children
who grow up in poverty are much more likely than other children to experience conditions that
make learning difficult and put them at risk for academic failure.4 Moreover, the longer a child is
poor, the more extreme the poverty, the greater the concentration of poverty in the child’s
surroundings, and the younger the child, the more serious the effects on the child’s potential to
succeed academically
The federal government and virtually all of the states recognize this reality, and they
proclaim that overcoming the achievement gaps related to poverty and race is the country’s
principal educational policy. But although they have established ambitious outcome goals and
hold students and teachers accountable for reaching them, officials in Washington and in most of
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the states have failed to ensure that the schools have the resources they need to meet these goals.
This malignant neglect has two separate dimensions: a failure to provide adequate resources for
basic K–12 education to schools in low-income neighborhoods, and a failure to provide the
additional early education, health, after-school summer, parent engagement, and other
comprehensive services that students from poverty backgrounds need to have a meaningful
opportunity to meet challenging state academic standards. This article discusses each of these
deficiencies and then asserts that the United States’ critical educational goals cannot be met
unless the courts have an active and sustained role in pressing policy makers to give the schools
sufficient resources to provide meaningful educational opportunities to all U.S. students.

Funding Inequities
In 1991, Jonathan Kozol described in excruciating detail the deprivations that students in lowincome areas in Illinois, New York, New Jersey, and Texas suffered because of the “savage
inequalities” that existed in the education finance systems in those states and in most other parts
of the country.5 Since that time numerous educational reforms have been implemented, but in
most of the schools in which the children of the poor are enrolled resource deprivations remain
unremedied and the conditions under which they attempt to learn remain bleak. The prime reason
for this pattern of deprivation is the inherent inequity that stems from the fact that a majority of
the funds that support public education historically have been raised through local property taxes.
This means that children who live in districts with low wealth and low property values—as most
low-income and most minority students do—will have substantially fewer resources available to
meet their educational needs.
Last year, the National Commission on Equity and Excellence in Education found that
“deep inequities in school funding . . . remain entrenched across our nation’s states and school
districts at a time when more than 40% of all American school children are enrolled in districts
of concentrated poverty.”6 The commission found that in most states, the highest-spending
districts expend about twice as much per pupil as the lowest-spending districts; in some states,
such as California, the ratio is more than 3-to-1. Even excluding the top 5 percent of districts,
spending in California in 2009 ranged from $6,032 to $18,025 per pupil.7
To deal with these longstanding and increasingly consequential problems, the
commission recommended “bold action by the states—and the federal government—to redesign
and reform the funding of our nation’s public schools.”8 The report calls on all of the states to
take the following steps:




Identify and publicly report the teaching staff, programs and services needed to provide a
meaningful educational opportunity to all students of every race and income level.
Determine and report the actual cost of resources identified as needed to provide all
students a meaningful educational opportunity based on the efficient and cost-effective
use of resources.
Adopt and implement a school finance system that will provide equitable and sufficient
funding for all students to achieve state content and performance standards. “Equitable
funding” includes the provision of additional resources to address the academic and other
needs of low-income students, students with disabilities and English-language learners,
and for districts and schools serving large concentrations of low-income students and
those in remote areas.
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Ensure that their respective finance systems are supported by stable and predictable
sources of revenue.
Develop systems to ensure districts and schools effectively and efficiently use all
education funding to enable students to achieve state content and performance standards.9

In many parts of the country state courts have issued rulings that have pressed for these
kinds of reforms. The state courts became the locus for these cases because in 1973, in a legal
challenge to Texas’s education finance system, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to invalidate that
state’s highly inequitable scheme. Although the high court agreed that Texas’s system was
inequitable, nevertheless, the justices refused to uphold the plaintiffs’ claims, primarily because
they determined that education is not a “fundamental interest” under the U.S. Constitution.10
Following this major setback in the federal courts, advocates turned to the state courts.
Over the past forty years, constitutional challenges to state systems for funding public education
have been litigated in the courts of forty-five of the fifty states. Shortly after the U.S. Supreme
Court issued its decision in Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court held that even if education
is not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution, it clearly is so under the California
constitution.11 Soon thereafter, courts in states such as New Jersey, Connecticut, and West
Virginia also declared their state education finance systems unconstitutional. Plaintiffs’ fortunes
in these cases have waxed and waned, but overall they have prevailed in approximately 60
percent of the rulings of the highest state courts.12
The courts’ intervention in education finance matters has resulted in significant increases
in the adequacy of educational funding and the equity of resource distributions in many states. In
Kentucky, for example, litigation resulted in dramatic reductions in spending disparities among
school districts, the redesign and reform of the entire education system, and a significant increase
in that state’s student achievement scores.13 In Massachusetts, enactment of the Education
Reform Act of 1993 in response to that state’s adequacy litigation also sharply reduced the
funding gaps between rich and poor school districts,14 and the percentage of students achieving
proficiency on state tests has risen dramatically.15 Decades of litigation in New Jersey on behalf
of the largely minority, low-income students in thirty-one urban districts has resulted in
significant increases in their achievement test scores;16 one of these districts, Union City, a 92
percent Latino district that is the poorest in the state, has effectively closed the achievement gap
between its students and non-urban students, and it may be the first urban district in the United
States to sustain academic achievement into the middle grades.17
In other instances, though, strong resistance from the governor or the legislature or both
has delayed or impeded mandated reforms. In Ohio, for example, the legislature had partially
responded to a series of court orders by, among other things, reducing funding inequities and
improving school facilities following the declaration of unconstitutionality. The legislature’s
failure to implement fully the judicial orders, however, and the judges’ unwillingness to confront
the legislature led the state supreme court to retreat from the fray and terminate the cases before
an appropriate remedy had been effectuated.18 In West Virginia, the legislature virtually ignored
the courts’ extensive orders throughout the 1980s but then implemented some more limited
reforms after another follow-up litigation was initiated in the mid-1990s.19 In Alabama, after a
change in its membership following an election, the court sua sponte reopened Alabama
Coalition for Equity v. Spiegelman,20 a case it had decided for the plaintiffs in 1993, and after
soliciting arguments from the two sides, dismissed the case, citing separation of powers and
justiciability concerns.21
3

New England Journal of Public Policy

Overall, then, despite Rodriguez’s closing of the federal courts to fiscal equity and
educational adequacy litigations in 1973, progress has been made toward overcoming inequities
in the funding of public education in the decades since because of the willingness of many state
courts to pick up the mantle in this area. Twenty-seven state courts have issued rulings that have
attempted to promote meaningful educational opportunities, especially for low-income and
minority students. Courts in nineteen other states, however, have refused to accept jurisdiction or
have otherwise found for the defendants, and in five other states no litigations have been
initiated. And although the remedies issued by the states where the plaintiffs have prevailed have
resulted in increased equity and improvements in educational opportunities and educational
achievement, some of the state court remedies have not proven successful.
Need for Comprehensive Services
Efforts to overcome the achievement gaps that largely stem from students’ poverty backgrounds
are not succeeding at an acceptable pace because the reform efforts do not match the enormity of
the problem. The escalating proportion of students from low-income households in our schools
and the abundant evidence of the impact of poverty on their readiness for school success require
a much more extensive and comprehensive approach to educational equity than the United States
has mounted to date.
The impact of poverty on children’s readiness to learn is profound. Children from lowincome households are more likely to be exposed to lead dust and poisoning, vision and hearing
problems, untreated cavities, and asthma, all of which directly relate to capacity for learning. For
example, lead exposure is connected with lowered IQ scores.22 Children spend, on average, a
thousand hours a year in school but five thousand hours in the neighborhood and with their
families.23 This means that if we seek to deal effectively with the impediments to learning that
surround children from poverty backgrounds, we must provide them a broad range of
“supplementary educational interventions” during their nonschool hours.24 Such services should
include early childhood education programs, after-school and summer programs, family and
community support, health, and nutrition.25 Unless we attend to these broad needs, we will never
overcome the significant achievement gaps between low-income and minority students and their
more advantaged peers.
Because out-of-school factors directly impede academic achievement, they can no longer
be relegated to the sidelines of the education policy dialogue; they must be tackled head on. The
potential benefits of providing such comprehensive supports and services have long been
recognized. In the nineteenth century, the settlement houses were an early model for providing a
variety of services to children and their families. The 1960s’ War on Poverty expanded programs
for children, although it left them largely uncoordinated. Spurred by research in the social
sciences in the 1970s and 1980s, a widespread understanding emerged of the benefits of the
coordinated delivery of a wide range of health, mental health, family, and educational services to
children.
In recent years, we have seen a burgeoning of initiatives, programs, projects, and
activities that seek to integrate education and supports. The delivery models employed include
full-service community schools, promising neighborhood initiatives modeled on the Harlem
Children’s Zone, citywide or county-wide collective impact projects such as Say Yes Syracuse
and Strive Cincinnati, and a variety of other collective impact initiatives.
Although the importance of taking a comprehensive approach to the well-being of
children has, therefore, been widely recognized, efforts to date have not been effectively
4
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coordinated or extended on the systematic, statewide basis that is necessary to provide
meaningful educational opportunities for all children. The successful models of coordinated
comprehensive services have not been sufficiently publicized, replicated, funded, and brought to
scale. If we are to meet the nation’s stated goals for educational opportunity and educational
achievement, we need to vastly expand our understanding of, and advocacy for, effective
mechanisms for providing comprehensive educational equity.
Ironically, however, despite the enormity of the deprivations suffered by children from
poverty backgrounds and the magnitude of their learning needs, in the United States today the
children with the greatest needs by and large have the fewest resources provided to them.
Although the legal challenges to this pattern of inequity triggered a vigorous debate over the past
few decades about whether “money matters” in education, the overwhelming consensus of the
research and of the many judicial decisions that have considered this question is that money does
matter—if it is spent well.26 The real issue, then, is not whether additional funding for
comprehensive services is necessary but what steps need to be taken to ensure that funds
appropriated for this purpose are used in an efficient and cost-effective manner.
Funding for public education, however, is not and cannot be unlimited. Therefore, money
that is appropriated for school-based services and for critical supplementary services must be
spent in ways that are strategic and accountable. The provision of services in each of the
comprehensive educational opportunity areas needs to be approached through careful costbenefit analyses of likely gains and with continuing oversight of the effectiveness of the methods
of delivering the particular services. The critical concerns should be (a) how do we get better
results for present investments and (b) what new investments are most likely to yield the greatest
long-range educational gains. The kinds of cost-benefit studies undertaken by Levin and Belfield
need to be replicated and expanded, and future-cost studies for determining legislative
appropriations for in-school and out-of school educational services need to be correlated with
analyses of best practices and most promising practices in particular areas of education. 27
Some may ask, why take this comprehensive approach when a number of studies point to
high-poverty, high-minority schools that are “beating the odds” and distinguishing themselves
with good outcomes thanks to high-quality teaching and great leadership? The goal, however,
must go beyond helping some schools to beat the odds against success; we must aim to lower
those odds for all schools. We need to study the broad range of factors that have contributed to
success in particular initiatives and determine the extent to which these practices are replicable
and can be implemented on a larger scale and for sustained periods.
If these comprehensive services are to be provided on the scale and in the sustained
manner that is needed to truly meet the needs of the growing number of children from poverty
backgrounds in our schools, disadvantaged students’ access to the necessary comprehensive
services needs to be seen as a basic right rather than as a discretionary benefit that policymakers
may bestow or deny. A strong case can be made on both statutory and constitutional grounds for
establishing such a right.28 Doing so will focus attention on the critical link between poverty and
achievement gaps and will require the government to provide the full range of resources
necessary to meet the urgent needs of children from backgrounds of poverty.
The Necessary Role of the Courts
If meaningful educational opportunity for all children is to be achieved, the courts must not only
articulate a right to comprehensive educational opportunity, but they must also effectively
enforce that right. After all, contemporary understandings of equal educational opportunity were
5
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largely created by Brown v. Board of Education and shaped by the series of federal
desegregation and related education cases that followed in its wake.29 The state court fiscal
equity and education adequacy litigations have maintained and magnified the egalitarian
momentum, even as the federal courts’ active pursuit of school desegregation has abated, and
they have begun to define in concrete terms the elements of meaningful educational opportunity,
including the comprehensive services discussed in the previous section.
But as the federal courts’ retrenchment in enforcing school desegregation and the state
courts’ inconsistent follow-through in the remedial stage of many of the state court education
finance cases demonstrate, the courts’ involvement in education policy litigations has not
consistently realized its potential for promoting positive educational reform. One of the major
reasons for delay and resistance to constitutional mandates in these cases is that many
policymakers and many judges are reluctant to understand and acknowledge the importance of
the courts’ role in educational reform. Opponents attack the legitimacy of the court’s
involvement, claiming that it is a usurpation of legislative and executive authority, and they
claim that the courts lack institutional capacity to effectively promote necessary reforms. 30 These
charges of judicial usurpation and institutional incapacity, which originated with political
opposition to the desegregation decrees of the federal courts in the 1960s and 1970s and have
been repeated as a mantra ever since, have little doctrinal or empirical substance.
Abram Chayes confronted these objections in a major article he wrote in 1976 that
describes in detail the “new model” of public law litigation and relates the growth of the judicial
involvement in the reform of public institutions since Brown to the broader expansion of
governmental activities in the welfare state era.31 Malcolm Feeley and Edwin Rubin, agreeing
with this perspective, put it this way:
[Judges] are part of the modern administrative state. . . . And they fulfill their role
within that context. Under certain circumstances that role involves public policy
makings; as our state has become increasingly administrative and managerial,
judicial policy-making has become both more necessary for judges to produce
effects and more legitimate as a general model of governmental action.32
That the courts’ expanded role is a fundamental judicial reaction to deep-rooted social
and political trends seems to be borne out by the fact that the activist stance initiated during the
Warren Court era has persisted to a large extent through the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts
years, and that conservatives no less than liberals now tend to look to the courts routinely to
remedy legislative or executive actions of which they disapprove.
In the 1980s, my colleague Arthur R. Block and I undertook two major empirical studies
to test the validity of the competing arguments in the judicial activism debate in actual instances
of educational policymaking by courts, legislatures, and a major administrative agency, the
Office of Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.33 We
concluded, among other things, that the evidentiary records accumulated in the court cases were
more complete and had more influence on the actual decision-making process than did the
factual data obtained through legislative hearings. The latter tended to be “window dressing”
occasions organized to justify political decisions that had already been made. 34 Our study also
found that judicial remedial involvement in school district affairs was less intrusive and more
competent than is generally assumed, largely because school districts and a variety of experts
generally participated in the formulation of reform decrees, with the courts serving as catalysts
and mediators. The courts’ “staying power” and their ability to respond flexibly to changed
6
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circumstances was also markedly more effective than that of the legislatures and the
administrative agency.35
The irony of the fact that some political commentators and academics continue to invoke
anachronistic “judicial activism” phrases is that, while these pundits persist in arguing that the
courts’ new role is usurping legislative powers, Congress and the state legislatures have
themselves asked the courts to take on more of these policymaking activities by passing
regulatory statutes that directly or implicitly call for expanded judicial review. A prime example
is the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, in which Congress set forth a detailed set of
substantive and procedural rights and established a new area of court jurisdiction for individual
suits, regardless of the amount in controversy.36 Under these circumstances, as Chayes aptly puts
it, we should “concentrate not on turning the clock back (or off), but on improving the
performance of public law litigation.”37
One of the major fallacies of those who argue that courts lack the institutional capacity to
deal with complex social policy issues is that they focus on the limitations of the judicial branch,
while ignoring the comparable institutional shortcomings of the legislative and the executive
branches. For example, Donald Horowitz, one of the foremost critics of the courts’ new role,
catalogued a bevy of examples of alleged judicial incompetence, ranging from receiving
information in a skewed and halting fashion to failing to understand the social context and
potential unintended consequences of the cases before them.38 As Neil Komesar has forcefully
pointed out, however, Horowitz’s critique, like that of many of his current disciples, was
unreasonably one-sided:
Horowitz’s study can do no more than force us to accept the reality of judicial
imperfection. By its own terms it is not comparative, and that is far more damning
than Horowitz supposes. All societal decision makers are highly imperfect. Were
Horowitz to turn his critical eye to administrative agencies or legislatures he
would no doubt find problems with expertise, access to information,
characterization of issues, and follow-up. Careful studies would undoubtedly
reveal important instances of awkwardness, error and deleterious effect.39
In the state-court educational equity and adequacy cases, among the main criticisms of
judicial intervention are that the courts have failed to “require[e] the efficient or cost-effective
use of funds,”40 that they assumed that “school districts are organized in a way that ensures that
they are making productive use of the money they now receive from taxpayers or of the
additional money they would receive if adequacy campaigns prevailed.”41 As Komesar points
out, however, none of these critics has even claimed that the other branches of government have
been more effective than the courts in ensuring the productive use of educational funding.
The fact is that providing meaningful educational opportunities to eliminate or
substantially narrow achievement gaps is a daunting task that no governmental entity has been
able to solve. If Brown’s vision of equal educational opportunity is actually to be realized, it will
require the sustained commitment of all three branches of government, at the federal and state
levels, working collaboratively in dramatic new ways. In the complex administrative
environment in which we now live, no single institution, whether a legislature, an administrative
agency, or a court, can successfully resolve major social problems. Effective policymaking in a
complex regulatory environment requires continuing interchanges and often continuing
involvement of all three branches of government. Successful implementation of meaningful
educational opportunity has generally occurred in the past when the judicial, legislative, and
7
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executive branches worked collaboratively together, as in Congress’s advancing the
desegregation remedies formulated by the courts through the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act and Title VI statutes,42 and in Congress’s enactment of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act.43
In considering the role of the courts in promoting meaningful educational opportunities,
the approach should be, not repetition of abstract rhetoric about judicial “usurpation,” but
consideration from a comparative institutional perspective of what functions courts can best
undertake, in collaboration with the other branches, to promote effective school reform practices.
What is needed, therefore, is not a competition but a “colloquy” 44 among the branches to get this
demanding job done. Such a colloquy should build on the realization that each of the three
branches has specific institutional strengths and weaknesses in regard to social policy making
and remedial problem solving. The focus therefore should be on how the strengths of each of the
branches can best be jointly brought to bear on solving critical social problems.
Although a full consideration of which functions can best be undertaken by the courts, by
legislatures, and by executive agencies will require substantially more dialogue and
consideration than can be dealt with in this article, a few preliminary illustrative points about the
courts’ comparative institutional strengths are apparent. First, declaring and insisting on the
vindication of constitutional rights is the courts’ prime constitutional responsibility. The courts’
role in articulating constitutional principles and affirming the right of all children to an adequate,
meaningful, and comprehensive educational opportunity is of paramount importance. The
concept of equal educational opportunity that has been at the core of political and legal advances
for the past fifty years would not have occurred without the Supreme Court’s landmark decision
in Brown, nor would education finance reform and an insistence that poor and minority children
be provided the resources they need to have a meaningful educational opportunity have occurred
without the intervention of the state courts. Full realization of these values through the
establishment of a right to comprehensive educational opportunity also will not come about
without the continued active involvement of the courts.
Second, because state legislatures and executive agencies overseeing school districts have
at times failed to ensure the effective use of education funds, courts need to become more, not
less, active at the remedy stage of equal opportunity and adequacy litigations. As noted earlier,
virtually all the economists and fiscal policy analysts agree that money matters in education—if
the money is spent well. Ensuring accountability and the effective use of funds is a function for
which the courts are particularly well suited. State courts have proved to be highly adept at
promoting and reviewing cost studies that provide proper parameters for adequate funding. This
does not mean that courts should undertake cost studies or devise the econometric methodologies
that should be used in such studies. These functions are better undertaken by the other branches.
Rather, judicial review is important in the costing-out process in providing a neutral forum for
reviewing the validity of legislative or executive actions when allegations of manipulation or
misuse of the cost study data arises.45
Courts similarly are well equipped to review and enforce effective accountability
measures to ensure that the manner in which education funds stemming from adequacy cases are
used is cost-efficient, productive, and targeted. Ironically, opponents of judicial involvement in
education adequacy cases rebuke the courts for mandating sizeable increases in education
funding without taking any steps to ensure that the money is actually spent effectively. But, at
the same time, they argue that the courts must terminate their involvement in these litigations as
soon as possible. The fact is that courts have a unique capacity to ensure that effective
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accountability measures are put into effect, not by micromanaging the day-to-day operations of a
school system, but in making sure that state education departments and school districts do their
jobs well.
Because the challenge of meeting the needs of students from poverty backgrounds
requires a broad, comprehensive range of meaningful educational opportunities, the courts must
play a central role in articulating the constitutional principles involved and in overseeing the
remedies to make sure that the solutions the legislatures and state education agencies devise are
appropriate, and that they are fully and fairly implemented.
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